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that for which the noble Army of Martyrs were content to die. We
allude to Mr. Choate's most interesting and instructive address at
the Quarter Century celebration of the settlement of his pastor,
Rev. Dr. Adams, in the Essex Street Church, and to the affecting
baptism of his dying child, by Rev. Dr. Winslow. The latter
occasion presents a scene of the most affecting beauty and pathos,
the description of which it is impossible to read without feeling
how tenderly the Christian father watched over the spiritual welfare of his children to the last moments of their earthly life, and
at the same time how childlike and sincere must be the faith of
such a father, who, at such a time, did not- dare trust his child,
without the seal of that sacrament which the Church of all ages
commands us not wilfully to neglect, even upon the peril of our
soul's salvation.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of the United States.
Nos. 134, 163, 170, 261, 262, 263.
CLAIMANTS OF SCHOONERS BRILLIANT, CRENSHAW, BARK HIAWATHA,
BRIG AMY WARWICK, APPELLANTS, vs. UNITED STATES.

Prize Oases.
Neutrals have a right to challenge the existence of a blockade defacto, and also the
authority of the party instituting it. They have a rigit to enter the ports of a
friendly nation for the purposes of commerce, but are bound to recognise the
right of a belligerent engaged in actual war, to use this mode of coercion for
subduing the enemy.
To legitimate the capture of a neutral vessel or property on the high seas, a war
must exist defitcto, and the neutral must have a knowledge or notice of the intention of one of the belligerents to use this mode of coercion against a port, city,
or territory in possession of the other.
War is that state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force; and it is not
necessary that both parties should be acknowledged as independent 'nations or
sovereign states, nor that war should be solemnly declared.
As a civil war is never publicly proclaimed, eo nomine, against insurgents, its
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actual existence is a fact in domestic history which the Courts are bound to
notice and know.
Where the sovereign of a neutral state has acknowledged the existence of a war
by his proclamation of neutrality, a citizen of that state is estopped from denying the existence of the war, and the belligerent right of blockade.
The President is vested with the whole executive power of the United States, and
whether in suppressing an insurrection he has met such armed resistance, and
a civil war of such proportions as compels him to adcord them the character of
belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and the Courts must be governed
by his decision.
The President therefore had a right jure belli to institute a blockade of ports in
possession of the States in rebellion, which neutrals are bound to regard.
Under the constitution of this government, although the citizens owe supreme
allegLance to the Federal Government they owe also a qualified allegiance to the
state in which they are domiciled; their persons and property are subject to its
laws.
Hence in organizing this rebellion they have acted as Stazes claiming to be sovereign over all persons and property within their respective limits, and asserting
a right to absolve their citizens from their allegiance to the Federal Government.
The ports and territory of these States are held in hostility to the General
Government, and all persois residing in this territory whose property may be
used to increase the revenues of the hostile power, are in this contest liable to be
treated as enemies.
Whether property be liable to capturd as "enemies' property" does not in any
manner depend on the personal allegiance of the owner. It is the illegal traffic
that stamps it as "enemies' property."

These causes came up by appeal from decrees in prize, of the
Circuit Courts for the Southern District of 'New York, and the
District of Massachusetts, affirming respectively the sentences of
condemnation passed upon the vessels and cargoes by the District
Courts for said districts. The following opinion is confined to the
general questions of law which were raised by all the cases. It
does not discuss the specialfacts and circumstances of the respective cases.
March 9th, 1863.-Opinion of the Court by
GRIER, J.-There are certain propositions of law which must
necessarily affect the ultimate decision of these cases and many
others, which it will be proper to discuss and decide before we
notice the special facts peculiar to each. They are,
1st. Had the President a right to institute a blockade of ports
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in possession of persons in armed rebellion against the government,
on the principles of international law, as known and acknowledged
among civilized states?
2d. Was the property of persons domiciled or residing within
those states, a proper subject of capture on the sea as " enemies'
property ?"

1. Neutrals have a right to challenge the existence of a blockade,
de facto, and also the authority of the party exercising the right to
institute it. They have a right to enter the ports of a friendly
nation for the purposes of trade and commerce, but are bound to
recognise the rights of a belligerent engaged in actual war, to use
this mode of coercion, for the purpose of subduing the enemy.
That a blockade de facto actually existed and was formally
declared and notified by the President on- the 27th and 30th of
April 1861, is an admitted fact in these cases. That the President, as the executive chief of the government and commander-inchief of the army and navy, was the proper person to make such
notification, has not been, and cannot be disputed.
The right of prize and capture has its origin in the .jus"belli,
and is governed and adjudged under the law of nations. To legitimate the capture of a neutral vessel, or property on the high seas,
a war must exist do facto, and the neutral must have a knowledge
or notice of the intention of one of the parties belligerent to use
this mode of coercion against a port, city, or territory in possession
of the other.
Let us inquire whether, at the time this blockade was instituted,
a state of war existed which would justify a resort to these means
of subduing the hostile force.
War bas been well defined to be , that state in which a nation
I roseeztes its right by force." The parties belligerent in a public
Mar are independent nations. But it is not necessary to coustitute
war, that both parties should be acknowledged as independent
nations or sovereign states. A. war may exist where one of the
belligerents claims sovereign rights as against the other.
Insurrection against a government may or may not culminate in
an organized rebellion, but a civil war always begins by insurrection against the lawful authority of the government. A civil war
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is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents-the
number, power, and organization of the persons who originate and
carry it on. When the party in rebellion occupies and holds in a
hostile manner a certain portion of territory, have declared their
independence, have cast off their allegiance, have organized armies,
have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the
world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a war.'
They claim to be in arms to establish their liberty and independence, in order to become a sovereign state, while the sovereign
party treats them as insurgents and rebels who owe allegiance,
and who should be punished with d6ath for their treason.
The laws of war, as established among nations, have their foundation in reason, and all tend to mitigate the cruelties and misery
produced by the scourge of war. Hence the parties to a civil war
usually concede to each other belligerent rights. They exchange
prisoners, and adopt the other courtesies and rules common to
public or national wars:
"cA civil war," says Yattel, "gbreaks the bands of society and
government, or at least suspends their force and effect; it produces in the nation two independent parties, who consider each
other as enemies, and acknowledge no common judge. Those two
parties, therefore, must necessarily be considered as constituting,
at least for a time, two separate bodies, two distinct societies.
Having no common superior to judge between them, they stand in
precisely the same predicament as two nations who engage in a
contest and have recourse to arms. This being the case, it is very
evident that the common laws of war-those maxims of humanity,
moderation, and honor-ought to be observed by both parties in
every civil war. Should the sovereign conceive that he has a right
to hang up his prisoners as rebels, the opposite party will make
reprisals, &c., &c.; the war will become cruel, horrible, and every
day more destructive to the nation.'"
As a civil war is never publicly proclaimed, coonomine, against
insurgents, its actual existence is a fact in our domestic history,
which the Court is bound to notice and to know.
The true test of its existence, as found in the writings of the
VOL. XI.-22

LIFE AND WORKS OF RUFUS CHOATE.

sages of the common law, may be thus summarily stated: " When
the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, rebellion, or
insurrection, so that the Courts of justice cannot be kept open.
CIVIL WAR EXISTS, and hostilities may be prosecuted on the same
footing as if those opposing the Government were foreign enemies
invading the land." By the Constitution, Congress al'one has the
power to declarie a national or foreign war. It cannot declare war'
against a State, or any number of States, by virtue of any clausef
in the Constitution. The Constitution confers on the President
the whole executive power. He is bound to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. He is Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several States when called into the actual service of the United
States. He has no power to initiate or declare a war, either against
a foreign nation or a domestic State. But by the Acts of CorAgress of February 28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, he is autho
rized to call out the militia, and use the military and naval forces
of the United States in case of invasion by foreign nations, and to
suppress insurrection against the government of a State, or of the
United States..
If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President
is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does
not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without
waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether the
hostile party be a foreign invader, or States organized in rebellion,
it is none the less a war, although the declaration of it be " unilateral." Lord STOWELIL (1 Dodson 247) oberves: "It is not
the less a war on that account, for war may exist without a decla
ration on either side. It is so laid down by the best writers on
the law of nations. A declaration of war by one country only, is
not a mere challenge, to be accepted or refused at pleasure by the
other."
This greatest of civil wars was- not gradually developed by
popular commotion, tumultuous assemblies, or local unorganized
insurrections. However long may have been its previous conception, it nevertheless sprung forth suddenly from the parent brain
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a Minerva in the full panoply of war. The President was bound
to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to it by him
or them could change the fact.
It is not the less a civil war, with belligerent parties in hostile
array, because it may be called an " insurrection" by one side, and
the insurgents be considered as rebels or traitors. It is not necessary that the independence of the revolted Province or State be
acknowledged, in order to constitute it a party belligerent in a
war, according to the law of nations. Foreign nations acknowledge
lit as war by a declaration of neutrality. The condition of
neutrality cannot exist unless there be two belligerent parties. In
the case of Santissima Trinidad,7 Wheaton 837, this Court says:
"The Government of the United States has recognised the existence of a civil war between Spain and her colonies, and has avowed
her determination to remain neutral between the parties. Each
party is therefore deemed by us a belligerent nation, having, so far
as concerns us, the sovereign rights of war." See also 8 Binn. 252.
As soon as the news of the attack on Fort Sumter, and the
organization of a government by the seceding States, assuming to
act as belligerents, could become known in Europe, to wit, on the
13th of May, 1861, the Queen of England issued her proclamation
of neutrality, -recognising hostilities as existing between the
Government of the United States of America and certain States
styling themselves the Confederate States of America." This was
immediately followed by similar declarations, or silent acquiescence
by other nations.
After such an official recognition by the sovereign, a citizen of
a foreign state is estopped to deny the existence of a war with all
its consequences as regards neutrals. They cannot ask a Court to I
affect a technical ignorance of the existence of a war, which all the
world acknowledges to be the greatest civil war known in the
history of the human race, and thus cripple the arm of the Government and paralyse its powers by subtle definitions and ingenious
sophisms.
The law of nations is also called the law of nature; it is founded
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on the common consent as well as the common sense of the world.
It contains no such anomalous doctrine as that which this Court
are now for the first time desired to pronounce, to wit:
That insurgents who have risen in rebellion against their sovereign, expelled her Courts, established a revolutionary government,
organized armies, and commenced hostilities, are not enemic8 because they are traitors; and a war levied on the Government by
traitors, in order to dismember and destroy it, is not a war, because
it is an "insurrection."
Whether the President, in fulfilling his duties as commander-inchief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed
hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions, as
will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is
a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed
by the decisions and acts of the political department of the government to which this power was intrusted. "He must determine
what degree of force the crisis demands." The proclamation of
blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that
a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse
to such a measure, under the circumstances, peculiar to the ease.
The correspondence of Lord Lyons with the Secretary of State,
admits the fact and concludes the question.
If it were necessary to the technical existence -of a war, that it
should have a legislative sanction, we find it in almost every act
passed at the extraordinary session of the Legislature of 1861,
which was wholly employed in passing laws to enable the Government to prosecute the war with vigor and efficiency. And finally
in 1861, we find Congress "ex majore cautela," passing an act
approving, legalizing, and making valid all the acts, proclamations,
and orders of the President, &c., "as if they had been issued and
done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States."
Without admitting that such an act was necessary under the circumstances, it is plain that if the President had in any manner
assumed powers which it was necessary should have the authority
or sanction of Congress, that on the well-known principle of law
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"Omnis ratihabito, retrotrahitur et mandato equiparatur," this
ratification has operated to perfectly cure the defect.
In the,,case of Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 131, 182, 138,
Mr. Justice STORY treats of this subject, and cites numerous authorities, to which we may refer, to prove this position, and concludes,
"I am perfectly satisfied that no subject can commence hostilities
or capture property of an enemy, when the sovereign has prohibited
it. But suppose he did? I would ask if the sovereign may not
ratify his proceedings; and then, by a retroactive operation, give
validity to them ?"

Although Mr. Justice STORY dissented from the majority of the
Court, on the whole case, the doctrine stated by him on this point
is correct, and fully substantiated by authority.
The objection made to this act of ratification, that it is ex post
facto, and therefore unconstitutional and void, might possibly have
some weight on the trial of an indictment in a criminal Court. But
precedents from that source cannot be received as authoritative in
a tribunal administering public and international law.
On this first question, therefore, we are of opinion that the President bad a right jure belli, to institute a blo.ckade of ports in possession of the States in rebellion, which neutrals are bound to
regard.
II. We come now to the consideration of the second question.
What is included in the term "enemies' property ?"
Is the property of all persons residing within the territory of the
States now in rebellion, captured on the high seas, to be treated as
"enemies' property," whether the owner be in arms against the
Government or not?
The right of one belligerent not only to coerce the other by direct
force, but also to cripple his resources by the seizure or destruction
of his property, is a necessary result of a state of war.
Money and wealth, the products of agriculture and commerce,
are said to be the sinews of war, and as necessary in its conduct as
numbers and physical force. Hence it is, that the laws of war
recognise the right of a belligerent to cut these sinews of the power
of the enemy, by capturing his property on the high seas.
The appellants contend that the term "enemies" is properly
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applicable to those only who are subjects or citizens of a foreign
state at war with our own. They quote from the pages of the
Common Law, which say, "That persons who wage war against
the king may be of two kinds, subjects or citizens. The former
are not proper enemies, but rebels and traitors; the latter are those
that come properly under the name of enemies."
They insist, moreover, that the President himself, in his proclamation, admits that great numbers of the persons residing within
the territories in possession of the insurgent government, are loyal
in their feelings, and forced by compulsion and the violence of the
rebellious and revolutionary party, and its "de facto government,"
to submit to their laws and assist in their scheme of revolution;
that the acts of the usurping government cannot legally sever the
bond of their allegiance: they have, theref6re, a- correlative right
to claim the protection of the Goverhment for their persons and
property, and to be treated as loyal citizens, till legally convicted
of having renounced their allegiance and made war against the
government by treasonably resisting its laws.
They contend also, that insurrection is the act of individuals and
not of a government or sovereignty; that the individuals engaged
are subjects of law; that confiscation of their property can be
effected only under municipal law; that by the law of the land
such confiscation cannot take place without the conviction of the
owner of some offence; and finally, that the secession ordinances
are nullities and ineffectual to release any citizen from his allegiance
to the national government; consequently, the Constitution and
laws of the United States are still operative over persons in all the
States for punishment as well as protection.
This argument rests on the assumption of two propositions, each
of which is without foundation on the established law of nations.
It assumes that where a civil war exists, the party belligerent
claiming to be sovereign, cannot; for some unknown reason, exercise
the rights of belligerents, although the revolutionary party may.
Being sovereign, he can exercise only sovereign rights over the
other party. The insurgent may be killed on the battle-field, or by
the executioner, his property on land may be confiscated under the
municipal law; but the commerce on the ocean, which supplies the
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rebels with means to support the war, cannot be made the subject
of capture under the laws of war, because it is "unconstitutional"!!!
Now it is a proposition never doubted, that the belligerent party
who claims to be sovereign, may exercise both belligerent and sovereign rights. See 4 Cranch 272. Treating the other party as a
belligerent, and using only the milder modes of coercion which the
law of nations has introduced to mitigate the rigors of war, cannot
be a subject of complaint by the party to whom it is accorded as a
grace or granted as a necessity.
We have shown that a civil war, such as that now waged between
the Northern and Southern States, is properly conducted, according to the humane regulations of public law, as regards capture on
the ocean.
Under the very peculiar Constitution of this Government, although
the citizens owe supreme allegiance to the Federal Government,
they owe also a qualified allegiance to the State in which they are
domiciled; their persons and property are subject to its laws.
Hence, in organizing this rebellion, they have acted as States
claiming to be sovereign over all persons and property within their
respective limits, and asserting a right to absolve their citizens
from their allegiance to the Federal Government. Several of these
States have combined to form a new Confederacy, claiming to be
acknowledged by the world as a sovereign State. Their right to
do so is now being decided by wager of battle. The ports and
territory of each of these Statc are held in hostility to the General
Government. It is no loose, unorganized. insurrection, having no
defined boundary or possession. It has a boundary, marked by
lines of bayonets, and which can be crossed only by force.. South
of this line is enemy's territory, because it is claimed and held in
possession by an organized, hostile, and belligerent power.
All persons residing within this territory, whose property mnay be
used to increase the revenues of the hostile power, are in this contest liable to be treated as enemies, though not foreigners. They
have cast off their allegiance and made war on their government,
and are none the less enemies because they are traitors.
But in defining the meaning of the term "enemies' property,"
we will be led into error if we refer to Fleta and Lord Coke for
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It is a technical phrase
their definition of the word "enemy."
peculiar to Prize Courts, and depends upon principles of public as
distinguished from the Common Law.
Whether property be liable to capture as "enemies' property,
does not in any manner depend on the personal allegiance of the
owner. "It is the illegal traffic that stamps it as ' enemies' property.' It is of no consequence whether it belongs to an ally or a
citizen." 8 Cranch 384. "The owner pro 1hac vice is an enemy."
3 Wash. C. C. R. 183.
The produce of the soil of the hostile territory, as well as other
property engaged in the commerce of the hostile power, as the
source of its wealth and strength, are always regarded as legitimate
prize, without regard to the domicil of the owner, and much more
so if he reside and trade within its territory. See Upton, chap. 3d,
et cas. cit.
III. We now proceed to notice the facts peculiar to the several'
cases submitted for our consideration.

Supreme Court of Tlinois.
ANTHONY

S. SEELY VS.

THE PEOPLE,

for the use of

ALFRED W.

NEECE.
Vhere a party executes a bond as surety with another, whose name appears to the
bond, but which name has been forged, he will not be liable.

This was an agreed case, showing that suit was instituted upon
rhe office bond of Lewis W. Leick, master in chancery of
Greene county, against Anthony S. Seely, one of the securities
,hereon, in the name of the People, who sue for the use of Alfred
W. Neece, guardian of Jesse H. Neece and Pemnah Jane Neece.
Said bond is payable to the People of the State of Illinois, and
conditioned for the faithful discharge of the duties of the office
of master in chancery.
1 The rest of the opinion, relating to facts peculiar to the cases under considera.

ion, is omitted, as not being of general interest.-Editors Am. LAW REo.
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The general issue was filed and stipulation thereon, authorizing
all proper evidence to be offered thereunder, as though properly
pleaded.
It appears, that Leick was nominated master in chancery,- and
fled the bond sued on, which is in evidence : that Leick collected
money belonging to Jesse H. Neece and Pemnah Jane Neece, infants and wards as aforesaid of'A. W. Neece; that A. W. Neece,
as guardian for said wards, obtained judgment against said Leick,
for $138.24 ; execution returned, no property found.
Samuel Heaton testified, that his name appeared as one of the
securities on said bond, and that his name was a forgery thereto.
Heaton's name was first in order, assigned and recited- in bond.
It is admitted that the.last of said wards to come of age arrived at
age, 25th January, 1860. This suit was instituted March 20th, 1861.
On this evidence, the court below found the issue for the People,
for the use of Neece, the cause having been tried by the court
without a jury. Defendant below excepted, and moved for a new
trial, because said finding was contrary to law and evidence.
Jas. T. English, for plaintiff in error.
Stuart, Edivards & Brown, for defendants in error.
OATO'N, 0. J.-This action was on the office bond of a master in

chancery, against one of the sureties, whose name appears to the
bond. The bond is joint and several. The facts relied upon in
defence are these: In the body of the bond are three sureties
named-first, Heaton; second, Seely, the defendant; and third,
Morrow. When presented to the defendant for his signature, the
name of Heaton appeared signed to the'bond as a surety ; and the
defendant, supposing it to have been executed in fact by Heaton,
signed his name to the bond as a co-surety with Heaton. It turns
out that the name of Heaton to the bond was a forgery. Although
we have not been referred to, nor have we met with, a case precisely in point, yet we think upon principle, this should constitute
a good defence to the action on the bond. By a fraud practised
upon the defendant, by means of the commission of a high crime, lie
was made to assume a different and greater liability than he intended, or supposed he was assuming, when he executed the bond.
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It is not like the case where the surety, when he signs the bond, is
assured, and made to believe that others will afterwards sign it.
In that case he acts upon the simple assurance that another will do
an act which he knows may be defeated or prevented by various
accidents, and he must-therefore take the risk of such assurance
being fulfilled. But in this case he acted upon an apparent fact,
which, without the commission of a great crime by others, must
have been true, and the commission of this crime the highest ddgree of caution might not suggest; and he cannot be charged with
even slight neglect, in not having discovered the forgery. It cannot be said that his own credulity contributed in any degree to his
being bound without Heaton, instead of with him. It is true that
the obligee did not perpetrate, or in any way contribute to the
fraud, so that one of two innocent parties -must suffer, by reason
of this forgery, but that reasonable degree of 'favor which the law
extends to sureties, should exonerate the surety who has been
fraudulently induced to execute the bond, not by a false promise,
which a high or even a reasonable degree of prudence should have
admonished him not to rely upon, but by a forgery, which would
probably have deceived the most cautious person.
The judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded.
The foregoing case, for which we are
indebted to the courtesy of the reporter,
Mr. Peck, is one of some novelty, and
we are not quite sure how far the principles involved fully justify the result
at which the Court arrived.
1. It seems entirely settled, -that, so
far as the defendant is concerned, the
consideration of his promise or undertaking has failed to a considerable extent, but not wholly, for he is supposed
to have assumed the obligation, in part,
at least, upon the credit of the party for
whom he became surety. There being
two co-sureties named in the body of
the bond, he could not have relied upon
Heaton, whose name was forged, for
more than one-third of his indemnity.
This partial failure of an entire consideration is therefore no ground of

exonerating him from the undertaking
even as a simple contract, much less as
a specialty obligation, where the consideration is wholly unimportant.
2. The defence must therefore rest
upon the fraudulent representation by
which he was inluced to enter into the
obligation. And here, it seems to us,
the principle of the case is the same as
where the party signs, upon the assurance and with the agreement that the
bond is not to be delivered until certain
other co-sureties have also executed the
instrument.
The law seems to be well settled that
a bond or other instrument, not negotiable, where one or more of the sureties
sign with the assurance that the paper
is not to be delivered, as a binding contract, until all whose names appear in
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the body of the instrument have become
partieq to it, will not be binding, unless
this condition is complied with. Rawling vs. The United States, 4 Cranch
Rep. 219. Or if it be agreed that a
composition deed shall not be binding
upon the surety until all the creditors
execute it, the instrument does not take
effect until that is effected. Johnson vs.
Baker, 4 Barn. & Aid. 440. The deeds
in both the foregoing cases were regarded as escrows until the condition
precedent was complied with, and as
such held by the principal after execution by the surety. See also Pidcock
vs. Bishop, 3 Barn. & Cr. 605, where it
is held that any fraud practised upon
the surety will invalidate the obligation.
S. P. Fletcher vs. Austin, 11 Verm. R.
447.
3. The same principle extends to promissory notes and other contracts not
negotiable, or to negotiable contracts
before negotiation. Awde vs. Dixon, 5
Eng. L. &Eq. R. 512; Lloyd vs. Howard,
1 Id. 227; Palmer vs. Richards, Id.
529; Leaf vs. Gibbs, 4 C. & P. 466.

4. But in regard to negotiable instruments which are executed for the sake
of raising money in the market, and
especially after they have been once
negotiated, the rule is held otheiwise,
and the surety, or any other party, having executed the paper, and intrusted it
to others, is regarded as having given
them power to negotiate it. Passumpsic
Bank vs. Goff, 31 Verm. R. 315. The
surety must run the risk of the fraud
of his own agent, unless there is something upon the paper to show that other
parties, were expected to sign with
him.
Even a blank acceptance, which is
taken while blank, only binds the party'
to the extent of his agreement; but if
filled up and negotiated, it binds to the
extent of the contract. Hatch vs. Searles,
2 Smale & Giff. 147; 1 Am. L. C. 321,
322. Russell vs. Longstaffe, Doug. 14,
is thus essentially qualified.
We cannot perceive why the principal
case does not rest fairly upon the principle involved in the foregoing cases.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.*
MOSES L. NOYES AND ANOTHER VS. THE NEW HAVEN, NEW LONDON
AND STONINGTON RAILROAD

COMPANY.

A partner has power to compromise and discharge a claim of the partnership
against a third party.
And a payment to a partner is a good payment to the firm., although the other
partner or partners had given notice to the debtor not to pay to such partner.
The debtor has a right to pay his debt, and cannot be affected by the disagreement of the partners as to who shall receive the money. Any partner wishing
to prevent such payment must seek the aid of a court of chancery.
Whether the power of a partner to bind the partnership by an executory contract,
would not be affected by a notice from the other partners revoking his authority:
Quere.

N., one of two partners to whom a large sum was due from a railroad company on
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an unsettled account, gave notice to the company not to make a settlement unless both partners were present. E., the other partner, was seeking to obtain
the money due for the purpose of applying it to his own private use, and of defrauding N. ; and the railroad company, knowing of this intention and for the
purpose of aiding him in accomplishing it, as well as for the purpose of getting
a more favorable settlement of the account, made a secret settlement with E.,
and paid him a sum agreed to by him as the balance due, and took a discharge
of the partnership debt. N. had no knowledge of the settlement till E. had left
the state with the money, when he gave immediate notice to the company that
he should not recognise the settlement. In an action of assumpsit brought in
the name of the partnership against the railroad company, to recover the amount
of the account, it was held, that whatever remedy N. might have in any other
form, yet that no action could be sustained in the name of the partnership to
recover again the money so paid.

Assumpsit, brought by the. plaintiffs, partners under the name
of Noyes & Eddy, to recover an amount claimed to be due them
under a contract for the construction of a portion of the road of the
defendants. The defendants were defaulted, and the case heard in
damages before PRK, J.
On the hearing, it was found by the Court, that the defendants
on the 31st day of December, 1857, were indebted to the plaintiffs
on the contract in the sum of $18,808.38, and that of that amount,
the sum of $17,595.93 was on that day paid by the defendants to
and received by the partner Eddy, on behalf of the plaintiffs, in full
of the indebtedness.
The plaintiffs offered testimony to prove that Noyes. had notified
the defendants not to pay the balance due them to Eddy, and that
the payment was made in disregard of the prohibition, and claimed
that it was therefore not available to the defendants i.n their defence,
but the Court held that Eddy had a right as partner to receive payment of the money due the plaintiffs notwithstanding the dissent
of Noyes.
The plaintiffs further insisted that the defendants were guilty of
fraud upon Noyes, in the means taken to accomplish a settlement
with Eddy, and upon the evidence introduced by them in support
of this claim the Court found as follows:The plaintiffs commenced work under their contract in July
1857. and continued until December following. During all that
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time, all the transactions between the company and the copartnership were carried on through Noyes. On two occasions the president of the company passed by Eddy, when at hand, and procuring
a horse and carriage rode to Stonington, some twelve miles distant,
for the purpose of paying the monthly estimates to Noyes. In
November, it was arranged, that the contract should be given up,
and the defendants agreed to pay for all the work performed
• ccording to the terms of the contract. The work substantially
,eased on the 2d day of December, 1857, when the chief engineer
commenced making up the final estimates of work dore. Noyes at
this time was waiting at Stonington for the final estimate to be
completed. It was completed on the 30th of December, and for
some time before Noyes had made daily inquiries when it would be
finished. He was told repeatedly, that the final estimate would be
given to him, and the chief engineer so informed him but a few days
before its completion. Eddy during this time 'paid no attention
whatever to the final estimate. When the arrangement was made
to give up the contract, Noyes notified the president of the company
that all parties in interest must be present when the settlement
should take place; and afterwards, at Stonington, he requested the
president not to make a settlement or pay any money on account
of the partnership unless all parties were present, and the president
assented to this. Sometime previous to the settlement, the president entered into a secret negotiation with Eddy to settle with him
alone, and it ended in an agreement to do so. The chief engineer
was informed by the company of the fact, and instructed to keep
the matter secret from Noyes. The engineer obeyed, and Noyes
was deceived in relation to the time when the final estimate would
be completed, and knew nothing whatever of the contemplated settlement with Eddy until after it had taken place and Eddy had left
the State. The final estimate was completed about twelve o'clock
at night, on the 80th of December, and the chief engineer remained
in his office at Stonington, *where he resided, until it was finished.
At that time, it was arranged by the company to meet Eddy at
New London the next day for the purpose of a settlement, and Eddy
was telegraphed to at New York by the company to be there for
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the purpose. The parties met in New London, and the company
paid Eddy the sum of $17,595.93 on account of the partnership,
and received from him a full discharge of all the partnership claims.
When the arrangement was made to give up the contract, the firm
had certain property along the line of the road, which they negotiated a sale of to the company for the sum of $2500. In the settlement Eddy agreed to take $1700 for the property, on the representation of the chief engineer that it was not worth more than that
sum. The final estimate presented at the settlement, consisted
merely in the gross amount of the work done and the sums of money
that had been paid. Eddy knew but little concerning the matter,
and it did not appear that he took any measures to inform himself,
or had anything to say in the settlement in relation thereto. When
the parties met at New London, the company being apprehensive
that Noyes should ascertain what was being done, and come to New
London before th e settlement should be completed, directed two
men to watch for him. After the settlement it was proposed to
spend the night at New London, but fear was expressed lest Noyes
might come, and so it was thought best for Eddy to leave that night
for New York, which he accordingly did. A part of the amount
paid by the company was in checks upon one of the banks in New
Haven, payable within a few days, which checks Eddy, before
leaving, procured to be discounted in New London after the banks
had been closed for the day. Of the amount received. by Eddy,
about $100 came indirectly into the hand of Noyes through a third
person, and the balance Eddy, after paying $7477.20 to the creditors of the firm, appropriated to his own use. As soon as Noyes
heard of the settlement, he notified the company that he should not
hold himself bound by it, charged them with fraud, and declared
that he should call them to a legal account. The $100 he received
merely to apply on the account with the company, and did not
ratify the settlement made by Eddy. The greater part of the
$7477.20 paid by Eddy had been attached in the hands of the company, and the company required in the settlement that these debts
should be paid, and the remainder of the sum was not paid by Eddy
until after he was compelled to do so by sundry other creditors.
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On these facts, the Court found that Eddy in the settlement
intended to defraud Noyes; that he intended to get all the money
due the firm from the company into his own hands, to apply the
same to his own individual use, and never intended to account for
the same with Noyes; and that the transaction was carried on from
the first with such purpose. The court also found that the company
knew what was the purpose of Eddy from the commencement of the
transaction to its close, and entered into the arrangement, and
carried on their part of the transaction, partly under the expectation of a more favorable settlement with Eddy than with Noyes,
and partly to assist Eddy in getting possession of all the money
due the firm, that he might apply the same to his own individual
use; and consequently, that the company was guilty of fraud on
the plaintiff Noyes.
The Court decided that the settlement with Eddy was void as to
Noyes, but good as to Eddy, and that the defendants were only
entitled to the credit of-such sums as appeared to have been actually
applied by Eddy to the payment of creditors of the firm; and
thereupon, without finding what was the actual state of the accounts
between Eddy and Noyes, rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, for
the balance left after deducting the $7477.20 applied by Eddy to
the payment of creditors of the firm, and the $100 received by
Noyes. The defendants thereupon moved for a new trial.
Baldwin and Ialsey, with whom were Lippitt, Park,and -Pratt,
in support of the motion.-1. Each partner possesses the power to
collect debts, receive payment, and. give a discharge. Buddock's
Case, 6 Coke 25; Stead vs. Salt, 3 Bing. 101; Piersonvs. Hooker,
3 Johns. 68 ; Bruen vs. Marquand,17 Id. 58; .McBridevs. Hagan,
1 Wend. 326; Wells vs. -Evans, 20 Id. 251 ; Salmon vs. Davis, 4
Binney a75; Smiith vs. Stone, 4 Gill & Johns. 310; Coll. on Part.,
§ 468 ; Story on Part., § 115. And this even if insolvent.
fayor
vs. Hawks, 12 Ill. 298.
2. As Edd:y had full authority as partner to receive payment of
money due the firm, judgment should have been rendered for the
plaintiffs for the unpaid balance only; because, 1st. In suits by
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partners, all must join as plaintiffs. Story on Part., §§ 234, 235,
2d. Whatever is a: good bar or defence as to one partner, is
equally so as to all. Story on Part., Id.; Austin vs. Hall, 13
Johns. 286. 3d. The equity of a defrauded partner cannot there.
fore be worked out in a Court of law. Story on Part., §§ 286, 238 ;
Coll. on Part., §§ 643, 455, note to § 493; Homer vs. Wood, 11
Cush. 62; Jones vs. Yates, 9 B. & 0. 532; Richmond vs. Heapy,
1 Stark. 202; Wallace vs. Kelsall, 7 Mees. & .Wels. 264; Greeley
vs. Wyeth, 10 N. Hamp. 15; Gordon vs. Ellis, 7 M. & G. 607.
The Court held that the payment was binding upon Eddy, but not
upon Noyes, and yet rendered judgment for Noyes and Eddy
jointly to recover, as if no. payment had been made. 4th. The
remedy of a defrauded partner is by an action on the case or petition in Chancery. Romer vs. Wood, 11 Cush. 62; Longman vs.
Pole, 1 Mood. & Malk. 223; Coll. on Part., § 455.
236.

. Chapmanand -. Perkins (with whom were Palmer and Trumbull), contrA.-1. The only ground on which it can be claimed that
a new trial should be granted, is that the payment of the $17,595
was a good and valid payment to the copartnership. If, however,
it was. not a payment for the benefit of the copartnership, but a
payment to Eddy for his individual use, and for the purpose of
enabling him to defraud the partnership, which is u fact most explicitly found, then it was not, either in fact or in law, a payment
to the partnership, and does not operate to extinguish so far the
debt due to the partnership.
It is said, however, that the authorities are .decisivb against an
action at law in such a case in the name of the firm, and that the
only remedy of Noyes is by a bill in equity against Eddy and the
defendants. And the case of Jones vs. Yates, 9 B. & C. 532, is
r.eliei upon as a leading case upon this point. But that case is
clearly distinguishable from the present, in the fact that the misconduct of the partner was itself the ground of the action, not, as
a
here, the ground of defence.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Purdy vs. Powers, 6
Penn. S. R. 492, say, "The fraudulent act of one partner does
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not affect the title of the partnership." The case of Homer vs.
Wood, 11 Cush. 62, cited on the other side, turned upon the point
that the defendant was not implicated in the fraud of the partner.
In the case of Pierson vs. .Hooker, 8 Johns. 68, there was no fraud
in any of the parties. So in those of Stead vs. Salt, 3 Bing. 101,
Bruen vs. Marquand, 17 Johns. 58, McBride vs. Hagan,1 Wend.
326, and Salmon vs. Davis;4 Binn. 375. In the cases of Waltace
vs. .Kelsall, 7 Mees. & Wels. 264, and Richmond vs. Heavy, 1
Stark. 202, there was not only no question of fraud, but that circumstance is specially alluded to as an important one in each case.
In Longman vs. Pole, 1 Mood. & Malk. 223, it was held that if a
person colludes with one partner to defraud the others, a joint
action at law can be maintained by the other partners against the
person so colluding. In Greeley vs. Wyeth, 10 N. Hamp. 18,
PARKER, C. J., seems to recognise the effect of a fraud as we claim
it. So in Gordon vs. Bllis, 7 M. & G. 607, TiNDALL, 0. J, says,
on page 621, "There is no allegation in the plea of any collusion
between Gordon and the defendants."
It will be found that, in
all the cases cited on the other side, the element of fraud, so
prominent in this case, was wanting, and that in many of them this
absence of fraud was the turning point of the case. It is a maxim
of universal acceptation in the law, that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong; and the defendants can be allowed to
avail themselves of this defence only in violation of this important
rule.

The authorities in support of our general position are numerous.
Leavitt vs. Peck, 3 Conn. 124; Tanner vs. Hall, 1 Penn. S. R.
417 ; Dobb vs. Halsey, 16 Johns. 84 ; Cram vs. Gadwell, 5. Cowen
489; Everinghimvs. Ensworth, 7 Wend. 826; Aercien vs. Andrus,
10 Id. 461; Burwell vs. Springfield, 15 Ala. 273; .N ble vs.
e Olintock, 2 W. & S. 152; Minor vs. (aw, 11 Smedes & Marsh.
322 ; S kiafe v. Jackson, 3 Barn. & Cress. 421 ; Farrarvs. Hutchvnson, 9 Adol. & El. 641; Atlantic Bank vs. Merchants' Bank, 9
Am. Law Reg. 241; 1 Am. Lead. Cases 452; 1 Parsons on Cont.
154.
That a bill in equity is not the proper remedy, is manifest from
VOL. XI.-23
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the fact that a payment of the debt will be as good a defence in
equity as at law.
ELLSWORTH, J.-We are all satisfied that the defendants are
entitled to a new trial.
I
We can entertain no doubt with regard to the legal character
and effect of the payment of the $17,595.93 by the defendants to
Eddy, one of the partners, and one of the plaintiffs in this action.'
It must, in our judgment, put an end to the right of the plaintiffs

to recover that sum again in this suit.

The superior Court found, that this sum was paid to Eddy and
received by him in satisfaction of the debt now in suit, though
something less than the amount actually due; and the Judge
properly held that Eddy had a right to receive it for that purpose,
and that the settlement was good and obligatory upon him, though
upon what ground he could regard it as null and void as to Noyes
it is not easy to perceive.
On these premises it would seem to be impossible that Eddy and
Noyes can unite in suing for this sum already in the hands of the
former; and this attempt to force a second payment will be seen
to be entirely absurd if we suppose that Eddy had been the survivor in the action instead of Noyes, while the same rule would of
course prevail in either case.
The difficulty of maintaining a joint action upon the facts found
below is so apparent that the plaintiffs' counsel are compelled to
assert, and they do assert, that the payment of the $17,595.93,.
was not in fact a payment upon the partnershiR debt at all, but a
transaction entirely foreign to that debt; as perhaps a loan to
Eddy, or a delivery of so much money to him for some unknown
purpose. Such a view of the transaction we can by no means
concur in. It is a palpable denial of the finding of the Judge,
which is that Eddy received the money to apply, and in fact did
apply it, in payment and satisfaction of the debt. Not to insist,
as perhaps might properly be done, that the entire debt of $18,808.88
was released by the compromise (for one partner could do this),
we may at least say that the two partners can recover no more
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than the difference between that sum and the sum paid, and for
that it is agreed by the defendants that the verdict may stand if
the rest is remitted on the record.
Now letus inquire on what ground it is that the plaintiffs claim
that the money received by Eddy was not a payment and satisfaction of the partnership debt when it had been agreed that it
should be. It is to be observed that the state of the companyaccount between Noyes and Eddy nowhere appears upon the papers.
That fact seems to have been thought quite immaterial upon the
trial of the cause, as indeed it would be in a suit by partners
against a third person to recover an unpaid partnership debt.
Hence we have no means of knowing that Eddy, by receiving the
money, whether to apply on his own debt against the company, or
to pay-other creditors of the company, or to reimburse himself for
his capital advanced, has done his partner any injustice whatever.
Whatever may have been threatened, we do not see that any injustice has actually been 'perpetrated on Noyes, nor can we know it,
until the account is settled between thdm, or the state of the
account agreed upon.
But the counsel of Mr. Noyes claim it to be an important fact
that their client notified the president of the railroad company to
make no settlement unless both partners were present, and that
the president agreed to this. The counsel are not entirely agreed
whether this notice meant that the defendants should not settle
with certain factorizing creditors without the contractors were
present, or that one partner should not be paid unless the other
was present and agreed to it. Be this as it may, it is not found
that Eddy assented to the arrangement-or in fact had notice of it,
and he certainly had power as partner to settle with their debtor
and receive payment. He was not affected by what Noyes had
done, for, if so, then he could have stopped payment to Noyes,
and the defendants could not then have paid their debt, or made a
legal tender of it to either. 'This would be absurd. The defendants had nothing to do with the plaintiffs' quarrels. A Court of
equity could, if necessary, in a bill with proper averments, have
interposed; but the request of Noyes had no legal effect. With-
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out more than appears in this case the defendants could pay either
of the partners, for they constituted but one person. The circumstance that the president promised not to pay Eddy separately,
if that be the construction of the request, amounts to nothing
against Eddy. If the president has broken a legal promise to the
injury of Noyes, the remedy is against him, but it is not enough
to defeat the payment made to the partner Eddy.
It is urged further, that Eddy's purpose in effecting a settlement
was to get the money into his own hands and not account for it,
and that the defendants were cognisant of this, and yet settled
with him, partly because they could settle with him more favorably
than with both, and partly to enable him to put the money into
his own pocket. But Eddy is accountable for it at all events as a
partner, and we do not know but that every dollar of it was justly
due to him, or to the partnership creditors who perhaps are urging
their claims against him or his estate. We cannot see that &
fraud. has been accomplished to the injury of the partnership, o,
even of Mr. Noyes, although there has been a breach of the confi
dence which belongs properly to the partnership relation, and in
ordinary cases is inseparable from it ; and even if a fraud has been
committed by the company on Noyes, it would not be a fraud on
Eddy, or on the partnership as uch, and no action could be
maintained in the name of the partnership for it.
We have not thought it important to discuss the law of the cases
cited on the argument. It seems to us to agree with the views
which we have expressed as the result of our own reflections. We
consider the rule to be this-that wherever one partner settles with
a debtor of the company and receives payment of the debt, he cannot retain the money and repudiate the set~lement; nor can he,
either alone or in union with his partner, recover the debt a second
time.
It may be proper, in view of some of the cases cited, that we
remark that there is a wide difference between joint plaintiffs and
joint defendants in cases involving the acts of one partner, such
as settlements, and payments by or to him in the partnership
business. In the first each plaintiff must have a perfect cause of

